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Abstract 
The standard policy prescription is that markets should be privatized in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Little analysis has been done about the fertilizer privatization process. This study shows 
that existing food traders in The Gambia may achieve scope economies by marketing fertilizer, 
but problems of scale and access to fmance exist. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The standard policy prescription that has emerged from economic analysis during the past 
decade has argued for the privatization of the input and output markets in Sub-Saharan African 
countries (SSA) (World Bank). Donors and governments in several countries have attempted to 
move several sectors of their economies towards a freer market system. It is generally argued that 
the parastatal agencies must be closed in order to create a more attractive environment for private 
entrepreneurs to enter the market (Arthur Young; Lieberson; MAC Group; Rexford and Katz). 
However, there is a lack of analysis about the actual transition process in which the old economic 
agents disappear and the new ones emerge. Little thought is given to the nature of the economic 
agents who will be able to satisfactorily operate in the newly privatized markets. This issue is the 
main focus of this paper which reports on an analysis of the fertilizer market in The Gambia. 
The Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in The Gambia, which was initiated in 1985, has 
been viewed as one of the most successful structural adjustment programs in SSA (Radelet). The 
policy reform objectives in The Gambia included encouraging greater private sector involvement 
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in agricultural marketing with special emphasis on fertilizer. Fertilizer was one of the primary 
commodities whose importation and distribution had been controlled by the government supported 
Gambia Cooperative Union (GCU). Several studies have focused on the role of the GCU in a 
privatized fertilizer market, but none have carefully reviewed the operations of the private 
entrepreneurs who may eventually begin to operate in this input market (N agarajan, Graham and 
Meyer). 
Trade in The Gambia accounted for a large share (25%) of the total gross domestic product 
(GDP) in 1990/91 (Baydas and Meyer). The strategic location of The Gambia has contributed to 
its emergence as a dynamic entreport involved in a wide variety of trading activities to meet the 
growing domestic demand and to service the reexport trade to neighboring countries. Traders are 
heavily dependent upon the reexport trade which expanded greatly in the 1970s when Gambia 
maintained an open trade policy while neighboring countries increased tariffs to limit imports. 
This trend became even more evident under the ERP reform policies which resulted in reduced 
inflation, more stable foreign exchange rates and one of the most efficient telecommunication 
systems in the region. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that there exists a fairly dynamic set of importers who handle 
the importation, distribution and financing of a large volume of commodities under what appears 
to be quite competitive conditions. The large trading activity involves large amounts of imports 
which pass through a complex wholesale and retail network. In addition to the role played by 
importers, wholesalers and retailers manage the flow of commodities through the three principal 
stages of marketing: importation, wholesaling and retailing. This situation implies that these 
traders could be potential candidates to engage in a privatized fertilizer trade. 
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Food commodities, which constitute about 36.1 percent of total imports, represent the 
largest import item in The Gambia (AID). These commodities are mainly rice, flour, sugar, 
tobacco, tea and cooking oil. Flour, in addition to being an important ingredient for households, 
is the primary production input for a large number of traditional and modern bakeries. As an 
input into production, it is as important to bakers as fertilizer is to farmers. The objective of the 
research reported in this paper was to examine the operations and linkages of traders involved in 
importing, wholesaling and retailing food commodities, and especially flour. This inquiry allows 
us to explore the feasibility of one set of private traders, who have well established operations for 
one set of products, entering into the fertilizer market. This paper will identify the similarities and 
differences between flour and fertilizer and summarize the influence of these factors on the degree 
to which fertilizer could become another commodity profitably handled by these private 
entrepreneurs. 
The next section of the paper discusses the methodology used in the study. The third 
section describes the roles of the economic agents following the downstream market linkages of 
the various traders from importation to final consumer. The fourth section describes the fmancial 
contracts associated with each stage of the commodity market from importers to retailers. Section 
five addresses the important question of whether or not private food traders who handle flour, 
among several commodities, will likely emerge as private agents to sell fertilizer in privatized 
input markets. The last section presents the summary and conclusions. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
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The study of the flow of commodities in a particular sector, such as flour or fertilizer, may 
be appropriately conducted by examining the various channels through which these products pass 
as they flow from origin to the final end users. This approach has been referred to as the 
subsector approach. The subsector analytical methodology entails the study of vertical (upstream-
downstream) linkages in the distribution/production of commodities among the different economic 
agents (Boomgard et al.). It includes an analysis of the role of the various economic agents, the 
terms and conditions of their contracts and the linkages in their transactions. Furthermore, it helps 
to identify the constraints affecting the different economic units and the appropriate means for 
policy intervention into the market. 
In analyzing the flow of a commodity within a trader network, the subsector approach 
reveals important insights into vertical linkages, network coordination and competition in the 
market place. By surveying key agents operating at different levels in the marketing chain, a 
considerable amount of information can be collected about the process of distribution or flow of 
commodities and the nature of the financial contracts associated with these flows. Collecting 
information from both sides of an economic transaction, i.e. buyer and seller, especially when 
interviewing private traders who are reluctant to discuss the details of their business operations, 
reduces information asymmetries and generates credible data. 
In our examination of the food commodity subsector, a total of 12 traders or suppliers 
provided information for the first data set used in this study. They included seven importers, three 
wholesalers and two retailers, all of whom marketed flour as one of the several commodities 
handled in their business. The seven importers are among the largest importers of flour and other 
food commodities in the country; therefore, the information obtained describes the operations of 
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most of the flour activity in the country at this time. The small scale wholesalers and retailers tend 
to have fairly homogeneous operations compared to the large importers. 
The second data set used in this study was collected in a survey of small manufacturing 
enterprises in four subsectors. Roughly 40 enterprises were randomly interviewed in each of four 
subsectors including tailoring, tie-dye production, metal-working and bakeries. Data from the 
subgroup of 39 bakeries that constitute the customers of the flour wholesalers and retailers were 
used in the latter part of this paper to complete the analysis of the commodity flow to end users. 
III. ECONOMIC AGENTS IN THE FOOD COMMODITY SUBSECTOR 
The principal economic agents in the food trade network are identified as: foreign 
suppliers, brokers, importers, wholesalers, reexport traders, retailers, enterprises and households. 
Our analysis focuses mainly on the agents located in The Gambia; however, we will discuss their 
links with foreign suppliers. Each economic agent has a set of functions which are defmed by 
his/her position in the marketing channel. In some cases, certain functions overlap and/or are 
carried out by more than one agent simultaneously. 
As mentioned, seven major importers of food commodities were identified in the survey. 
They represent the leading supply channel for flour in the country. All are located in the capital 
city of Banjul where they have access to excellent communication with the rest of the world. 
Typically, these traders engage in importation on a regular basis mostly from Western Europe, 
handle the port requirements and custom clearances, and store the merchandise in their depots until 
sold. The commodities are sold in large and small wholesale quantities varying from a few toru 
to a few hundred tons. Thus, these traders assume the roles of both importers and wholesalers 
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Their clients are the reexport traders, smaller wholesalers/large retailers and medium scale 
enterprises, such as modern bakeries in the case of flour. 
The second major category of agents in the supply channel are wholesalers. The typical 
wholesalers represent numerous entrepreneurs who buy solely from importers and not from 
foreign sources. Most wholesalers, like most importers, deal with more than one food commodity 
to diversify their businesses. Diversification helps ensure some amount of sales and profits where 
there are sudden changes in prices or availability of these commodities. Each wholesaler normally 
deals with only one or two importers because they build a strong customer-supplier relationship 
which has some advantages with regards to financing their purchases as will be discussed later. 
Their major clients are small scale reexport traders, small local retailers, small scale enterprises 
and households. Most of the wholesale activity is concentrated in Banjul. 
Retailers constitute the third and last category of agents in the trading channel. They are 
scattered throughout the country. The role of retailing is assumed by small wholesalers/ large 
retailers as well as by small retailers. The latter group is represented by small corner shops in the 
local markets and neighborhoods which carry a variety of consumer items. These retailers buy 
from several suppliers, often from the larger wholesalers and occasionally from the importers. 
Bakeries and households constitute the local end users of flour in The Gambia. The 
medium scale modem bakeries typically purchase flour as often as twice a month from importers 
and occasionally from wholesalers. On the other hand, small scale traditional bakeries purchase 
mostly from retailers, as often as every day, and occasionally from wholesalers when they buy in 
larger amounts. The terms and conditions associated with the sale of flour by importers, 
wholesalers and retailers will be discussed in the next section. 
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IV. FINANCIAL FLOWS 
A well defmed set of formal and informal fmancial instruments and relationships have been 
developed in the food commodity trade. The formal fmancial contracts are mainly represented by 
the standard letter of credit utilized by all of the importers which are obtained almost exclusively 
from offshore foreign fmancial institutions under competitive conditions. The informal financial 
relationships are largely manifested in supplier credit contracts used to promote commodity sales 
among importers, wholesalers, retailers and their respective customers in the domestic markets. 
Table 1 presents a summary of the typical financial contracts used at each stage in the marketing 
channel. 
The terms and conditions that characterize a letter of credit are competitive interest rates 
of 1 percent per month, service charges of 2-5 percent, short term structure of 30-120 days and 
collateral requirements of a 25-7 5 percent advance deposit. The most significant advantage of this 
fmancial instrument is the flexibility it provides traders in the importation of commodities. 
Traders have a high turnover of commodities and, thus, require large amounts of working capital 
to finance their purchases. In addition, importers fmd that this financial instrument is an 
acceptable and convenient means to pay their suppliers. Hence, a letter of credit is a useful and 
efficient fmancial instrument for meeting the demands of most creditworthy importers. 
Suppliers credit predominates in the wholesaling and retailing of food commodities. This 
contract helps domestic customers, i.e. wholesalers, retailers and enterprises, avoid the many 
problems of the inefficient, risk averse domestic banking system and is used by suppliers as a 
marketing tool, especially at times of excess supply. The suppliers credit contract typically 
involves a down payment of approximately 25-75 percent at the time of purchase with the promise 
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to pay the balance by a particular future date which often ranges from one to 60 days. Clients 
frequently complete the payment, acquire a new consignment of goods and request suppliers credit 
once again. The terms and conditions are characterized by implicit interest rate charges that 
average 2-5 percent per month. The close supplier-customer relationship serves as a collateral 
substitute. 
A significant feature of these credit transactions is that each individual agent in the 
marketing channel is able to grant credit to his customers in amounts much smaller than the 
amount of credit he received from his supplier and for a shorter period of time. These informal 
domestic contracts can often be cleared by the time that an importer has to pay for the letter of 
credit. Through frequent contact with customers, suppliers are able to screen clients for credit 
sales and to enforce repayment. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FERTILIZER SECTOR 
The analysis conducted of the flour subsector provided information about the marketing 
channel for this important connnodity and the financial arrangements that facilitate its trade. A 
logical question to ask is whether or not the agents and financial contracts that facilitate trade in 
this subsector provide the conditions necessary for successful privatization of the fertilizer 
subsector. Are some of these agents likely to be able to take over and efficiently operate the 
fertilizer business? This issue is analyzed in this section. 
The large private food traders have accumulated considerable experience and knowledge 
over time in their trading activities. They have market contacts, storage and transportation 
facilities, knowledge about international trading, and established relations with offshore financial 
institutions. Nonetheless, there are important differences between flour and fertilizer that will 
affect the private sector response to the privatization of the fertilizer sector. Table 2 presents a 
summary of these factors grouped into possibilities for a) scope economies, b) scale economies, 
and c) access to finance. 
Four factors suggest that food traders might achieve scope economies if they decided to 
enter the fertilizer trade. If they expand into fertilizer, these dealers could easily use or expand 
their existing transportation and warehousing facilities, the trade linkages established between 
importers, wholesalers, and retailers, and the existing retailer outlets in villages and towns. 
Furthermore, their established creditworthiness with offshore financial institutions may be 
adequate for letters of credit and working capital loans. The important advantage that established 
food traders have with their multiproduct businesses is the flexibility of shifting among commodity 
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lines and, therefore, being able to make a profit and survive better in an uncertain dynamic market 
as compared to a undiversified, single product specialized fertilizer business. 
The scale of probable fertilizer operations does not provide a strong incentive to the food 
traders, however, and this is a major constraint. The food commodity trade, flour in particular, 
operates on a fairly large scale. Four principal factors suggest that private traders would fmd it 
difficult to achieve scale economies in the fertilizer trade, especially if they expect that there will 
be several competing agents for the small market. First, the total volume of domestic fertilizer 
demand is much smaller than for flour and more subject to potential govermnent and donor 
intervention. Second, the crop production cycle for which fertilizer would be used is much longer 
than the consumption or production cycle for flour, so there is a slower turnover of inventory. 
Therefore, sellers have fewer contacts with buyers and have less opportunity to monitor them as 
potential borrowers. Third, there are no good substitutes for flour whereas manure can partly 
substitute for fertilizer if the fertilizer-crop price ratio deteriorates. Fourth, there is great 
uncertainty about reexport demand for fertilizer. Some unreported cross border fertilizer imports 
apparently have occurred from Senegal, and it is unclear what conditions would be required for 
The Gambia to serve as an entreport for regional fertilizer imports. 
The differences in fmancial requirements between flour and fertilizer also pose a major 
obstacle. Flour traders have established efficient access to fmancial sources which appear to be 
reliable and reasonably priced. It may be difficult, however, to transfer these same techniques to 
the fertilizer business because a letter of credit is granted with specific commodity and term 
conditions. Problems may exist either a) in the acquisition of offshore capital, or b) in the 
granting and recovery of loans in the domestic market. 
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The rapid sales turnover and the decreasing term structure of loans in the marketing 
channel allows food traders to sell their stock on credit to their customers, yet get repaid in time 
to pay their credit obligations. The crop production season is several months long, however, so 
credit given in the fertilizer channel must be for a longer term. This means that importers must 
get longer term credit which may not be readily available or competitively priced even from 
offshore sources. If they fail to get longer term credit, a mismatch in term structure will emerge: 
traders will borrow short but will provide longer term suppliers credit to wholesalers/retailers for 
their seasonal loans to farmers. Interest charges (or foregone discounts) for credit sales will have 
to be substantially higher for fertilizer credit to compensate for the larger interest expense. 
Furthermore, because of less frequent monitoring, it is riskier for wholesalers to lend to retailers 
and retailers to lend to farmers for longer term fertilizer credit than for shorter term food 
commodity credit. Moreover, fertilizer loans are made for an inherently risky farming enterprise 
which involves larger size loans and implies larger potential losses than loans made for food 
commodities. This is true for suppliers credit at all levels in the fertilizer trade channel. A final 
critical problem in The Gambia is that the marketing of the single most important crop, 
groundnuts, is not yet privatized, so fertilizer dealers will not be able to develop interlinked 




The objective of this paper is to examine the operations and linkages of traders involved 
in importing, wholesaling and retailing of food commodities, especially flour, in order to explore 
the feasibility of them expanding into the privatized fertilizer market. The interesting feature in 
the Gambian markets is that the letter of credit that importers utilize in their operations is acquired 
from offshore foreign fmancial institutions while the majority of wholesalers and retailers draw 
upon the domestic informal channel of suppliers credit. Thus, it is clear that financial market 
segmentation exists in The Gambia. 
The analysis showed that the agents at all levels in the food commodity trade channels may 
realize some economies of scope if they expand into the fertilizer sector. But in terms of 
economies of scale and access to financial contracts, the requirements for flour and fertilizer are 
quite different. New specialized fertilizer traders would likely experience problems in achieving 
scale economies and access to finance for their business, and it is unclear if they would enjoy any 
major offsetting advantages. A critical problem concerns the lack of linkage with farm commodity 
markets. The repayment of fertilizer loans made to farmers in many countries is facilitated 
through input-output linkages. For example, food processors, traders, cooperatives, etc. purchase 
farm commodities so they deduct the cost of fertilizer advanced from the purchase price of the 
commodities acquired. Unless the groundnut trade is fully privatized and food commodity traders 
in The Gambia begin to acquire farm products, they will not be able to develop these linkages that 
have been effective elsewhere in enforcing loan contracts. 
The standard policy prescription calling for the privatization of markets in Sub-Saharan 
Africa represents a first step in improving economic performance. The process of privatization 
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is complex, however, especially in countries with large parastatal operations where private firms 
have long been repressed. It cannot be assumed that under privatization private firms will 
automatically emerge to provide efficient and timely services. This study in The Gambia has 
shown that there are serious constraints even for firms already marketing other food commodities. 
The Gambian example suggests the need for detailed microeconomic analysis of each privatization 
case in order to identify the constraints that may hinder the drive for privatization. Ironically, 
some of the private sector constraints to be faced in many Subsaharan African countries will 
undoubtedly represent the type of problems which prompted the creation of many marketing 
parastatals in the first place. 
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Table 1 Characteristics of the Financial Contracts Used in Food Commodity Trading 
Characteristics of the Financial Contracts for: 
Contract 
ImEorting Wholesaling Retailing 
(1) (2) (3) 
Type of Contract Letter of Credit Suppliers Suppliers 
Credit Credit 
Type of Financial Market Formal Informal Informal 
Length of Loan (Days) 30-120 7-60 1-7 
Size of Loan (Dalasis )a 840,000- 7,000-50,000 50- 500 
14,000,000 
Interest Rate(% per month) 1% 0 0 
Fees or Implicit Charges (%) 2-5 2-5 2-5 
Collateral I Substitutes 25-75% Cash Supplier- Supplier-
Deposit Customer Customer 
Relationship Relationship 
Delinquency Rate None Reported Few Cases Few cases 
Reported reported 
Default Rate None Reported Few Cases Few Cases 
ReEorted ReEorted 
a: US $ 1 = approximately 9 Dalasis 
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Table 2 Comparison of Flour and Fertilizer Trade 
Characteristics Flour Fertilizer 
I. Scope: 
Infrastructure Exists Could be used 
Wholesaler - retailer Exists Could be used 
linkages 
Villages retailers Exists Could be retailers 
Creditworthiness Exists May be used 
II. Scale: 
Nature Primary input Secondary input 
Total volume More than 100,000 tons ± 10,000 tons 
Production cycle Daily 3-9 months 
Turnover Rapid Slow 
Substitutes None Manure 
Reexport channels Large Questionable 
Foreign assistance Minimal, little distortion Large, large distortion 
III. Finance 
Length of loans 1-120 days 6 months or more 
Risk of lending Limited Potentially large 
Monitoring borrowers Frequent Infrequent 
Enforcement of repayment Adequate Insufficient 
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